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THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC 
DEPRIVATION AND REGIONAL 
DIFFERENCES ON INDIVIDUAL 
SECULARIZATION IN WESTERN 
EUROPE
Abstract
This article studies secularization at the individual level in a «most similar approach» study of 
13 Western European countries. Secularization is measured in two ways: as a decrease in Chris­
tian beliefs and as a decrease in the correlation between Christian beliefs and morality. In partic­
ular, the article scrutinizes the impact of two factors that are traditionally considered important 
for secularization: cohort and country. Based on data from the European Values Study, the article 
shows that the impact of cohort is primarily related to the individual’s economic deprivation dur­
ing his/her formative years. A sub-country regional analysis compares the impact of the country 
and denomination as social institutions and finds «within country» differences important in sec­
ularization and, in many cases, the impact of denomination as a social institution is identical in 
regions in different countries.
Keywords: secularization, Europe, cohort, social institutions, values
Introduction
Until the last decades of the 20th century, the process of secularization was almost con­
sidered a social fact—a permanent and irreversible process. However, evidence has 
gradually shown that religious change takes different paths in different parts of the 
world and that secularization in Western Europe is an exception compared to religious 
change in other parts of the world (see Davie 2000; Joas and Wiegandt 2009). For 
instance, Americans are very religious, and Putnam and Campbell (2012) argue that 
American society is becoming increasingly polarized religiously. There is a religious 
revival in several countries in Eastern and Central Europa (Tomka 2011), and religious 
development has taken a different path in many Third World countries. This research
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does not mean that the theory of secularization must be abandoned but that the scope 
of the theory must be made clearer. With respect to secularization, Western Europe is 
the exceptional case (Davie 2002). Hence, the «most different» comparative studies 
approach—in which generalizations are made based on a large number of different 
countries—must be supplemented with «most similar» studies, which make it possible 
to scrutinize secularization in more detail by selecting relatively similar countries or by 
comparing clusters of countries from different regions in the world (see Stark 2001). 
This article limits the analysis of secularization to Western Europe, where research has 
found a consistent, gradual decline in church attendance (Davie 2000, 2002). The 
article analyses a selection of Western European countries that are relatively similar, 
where «the prevailing conception of God is the conventional Christian deity» (Stark 
2001: 625). The selection of such countries makes it possible to go into detail with the 
two core variables that are traditionally used to explain secularization: cohort changes 
and country characteristics.
The article contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it gives a nuanced anal­
ysis of the process of secularization by studying it both as a belief system and as a rela­
tional concept—i.e., secularization is analyzed both as a change in the development of 
Christian beliefs and as change in the relationship between Christian beliefs and moral­
ity. Second, it offers an interpretation of the relationship between cohort and seculari­
zation. Third, this article will compare sub-country regions with the purpose of study­
ing how secularization may be explained by country-based or border-crossing social 
institutions.
After discussing the measurement of individual-level secularization, the article pro­
ceeds in two steps: first, a descriptive analysis of secularization in selected countries in 
Western Europe and, second, detailed discussion of individual-based and country- 
based explanations of secularization.
Measuring Secularization
Secularization may be understood as a process that takes place at different levels (soci­
etal, organizational and individual levels, see Dobbelare 2002). Based on survey data, 
this article limits its analysis to secularization at the individual level. Three different 
types of measures for secularization have been suggested: church attendance, religious 
values and the relationship between religious and secular values.
Many studies have investigated secularization by studying church attendance, 
which is a relatively easy and, perhaps, «objective» way of measuring integration in 
the church. As argued by Liichau (2014a), the problem is that church attendance can 
be measured both as a measure of orthodoxy and personal religiosity. For instance, a 
recent Danish study demonstrated a small increase in church attendance—especially at 
Christmas time. This, of course, may be due to increased religious motivations, but 
another possibility is that church attendance at Christmas may be an attempt to re­
invent family traditions in a society with few traditions (Andersen and Liichau 2011; 
Liichau 2014a).
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There is a lack of reliable data about developments in church attendance over very 
long time spans; and, to my knowledge, there are no systematic studies of church 
attendance prior to WWII. In the period after the war, a study from West Germany 
(Meulemann 1983) and unpublished data from LUchau (2014b) show strikingly similar 
results: a steep decrease in church attendance from 1950 to about 1970 and a much 
smaller decline after 1970.
A second type of operationalization focuses on social values—for instance, the 
belief in Christian dogmas (Andersen et al. 2013; Halman and Draulans 2006). Theo­
retically, the advantage of this operationalization is that the interpretation is less fuzzy 
than church attendance and that it is possible to address core Christian beliefs rather 
than just referring to God in more general terms as has been done in several studies. 
The disadvantage is that Christian dogmas may be perceived by some respondents as 
old-fashioned or difficult to relate to.
The third operationalization is based on the degree of the relationship between reli­
gious and secular values. This operationalization has been advanced, among others, by 
Wilson (1982) and Bruce (2011). The idea is that religious values become less author­
itative in relation to other social values—i.e., there is increased value segmentation. Of 
special interest here is the relationship between moral and religious values, but the 
empirical relationship between religiosity and morality seems to depend on the type of 
morality that is studied. «Sexual morality» and «morality sanctioned by the state» 
(Finke and Adamczyk 2008) seem to be differently related to religiosity. There is evi­
dence of relatively high correlations between religious beliefs and practices and sexual 
morality but lower correlations with state-sanctioned morality (Finke and Adamczyk 
2008; Parboteeah et al. 2008). Second, the correlations differ according to the kind of 
religious values that are studied. In general, it seems that moral beliefs are more con­
sistently and strongly related to values that emphasize the importance of religion or 
religious beliefs than to behavioral measures such as church attendance (Desmond and 
Kraus 2014; Finke and Adamczyk 2008).
Since there is evidence that religious values seem to have greater impact on moral­
ity than church attendance (Finke and Adamczyk 2008), I have chosen to use religious 
beliefs as a core variable in measuring secularization. This variable is supplemented 
with the value fragmentation variable, i.e. that secularization is measured as the lack of 
correlation between religious and secular values.
As mentioned above, the first part of the article is a descriptive analysis of the 
development in secularization. Consistent with most of the literature (Davie 2000; 
Halman and Draulans 2006), the first hypothesis states that there is a small increase in 
secularization in Western Europe in recent decades. This means that:
HI: the level of religious beliefs and the correlation between religious beliefs and 
secular values have become lower in recent decades.
This hypothesis is tested in a long-term perspective among countries that have partici­
pated in the European Values Survey during the period 1981-2008. Having established 
the expected tendency toward secularization in these countries, the article goes on to
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analyze macro- and micro-explanations for secularization. At the macro-level, studies 
of countries play a major role, but the article argues that this analysis must be supple­
mented with a study of social institutions. At the individual level, the cohort is the most 
common variable, and the article argues that cohort is a «container» variable and tests 
three ways to interpret this variable.
Country-Based Explanations
Most of the comparative research on secularization have been governed by a soft 
version of modernization theory. This theory has two elements: an evolutionary and a 
structural-functional perspective. The evolutionary perspective dates from Auguste 
Comte (1798-1857), who argued that countries develop from less to more advanced 
societies and, consequently, that countries may be ranked in an unilinear way according 
to some degree of modernization. In contemporary studies, this has been interpreted to 
mean a development towards societies characterized by more individualistic, libertar­
ian, and rational values. The structural-functional theory argues that a fragmented 
value structure creates problems for social integration. In relation to secularization, 
value fragmentation means that the importance of religious values for secular values is 
diminishing. Modernization is often assessed by wealth (measured by GDP, gross 
domestic product, or, PPP, purchasing power parity) or some measure of the level of 
technological innovations. Such factors lead to individualization, which comprises 
changes in all parts of society including the fact that traditional and institutionalized 
forms of religiosity will decrease (see Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Wenzel 2005).
Modernization theory is not by definition a study of nations. It would be equally 
possible to study clusters of countries (see Voas and Doebler 2014) or sub-national 
regions, but the analytic and empirical consequences of the modernization approach 
have generally been to compare countries that vary according to some of the core com­
ponents of modernization theory. One reason for this approach is probably that the sta­
tistical data sources are much better for country variables than for other geographical 
units.
A more advanced strategy is to combine country and individual variables, using 
multi-level analyses. Ruiter and van Tubergen (2009), for instance, distinguished 
between individual explanations for religiosity and two types of country explanations: 
compositional (explained by individual characteristics of the population in the coun­
tries) or contextual (explained by specific country characteristics). Among the country 
variables in Ruiter and Tubergen’s study are the degree of religious regulation, tertiary 
school enrolment, economic inequality (Gini coefficient), experience of war and 
urbanization. A similar study with very similar variables and results has been con­
ducted by Moor (2014).
One of the problems with this kind of analysis is that countries tend to come in 
«packages». The Scandinavian countries, for instance, are all wealthy with high levels 
of education and low inequality. Splitting up countries in a number of independent var­
iables does not account for the historically-established interdependency of the various
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elements. One way of approaching this issue is to focus on the impact of social institu­
tions on religiosity.
Social Institutions
Empirical analyses based, for instance, on European Values Study (EVS) data revealed 
that modernization theory did not satisfactorily explain the dynamics of value change 
in Europe (Arts and Halman 2014: 3). As an alternative, a social institutional approach 
has been suggested (Gundelach 1994; Haller 2002). Countries are not just geographical 
entities but also state institutions with a legal regulatory system that governs policy 
areas including policies related to the church. However, state institutions are not the 
only institutions that influence values. Some institutions are not limited to a single 
country but are characteristic of several countries. Institutions may also vary in differ­
ent parts of a country such as, for instance, traditional religious organization or tradi­
tional family structures (Todd 1985). In order to grasp border-crossing or sub-country 
institutions, we need to supplement the country as a unit of analysis with a study of sub­
country structures.
In this article, I have chosen to do a relatively simple analysis of the impact of insti­
tutions. I compare the distribution of religious values between regions whether they 
belong to the same country or not. Country-based explanations cannot be ruled out but 
will be supplemented with analyses of border-crossing institutions. These deliberations 
lead to two supplementary hypotheses:
The difference between Christian beliefs and value fragmentation follows (H2a)
state boundaries (the state matters) or (H2b) boundary-crossing institutions (insti­
tutions matter).
A related way of criticizing the focus on countries is Ulrich Beck’s argument about 
global processes. Beck uses the term «methodological nationalism» to criticize the 
focus on countries rather than global processes. According to Beck, globalization 
implies that normal social science categories are becoming zombie categories, i.e., 
«living-dead» categories that «blind the social sciences to the rapidly changing realities 
inside the nation-state containers» (Beck 2002: 24). Rather than studying countries as a 
unit, according to Beck, we should study global phenomena that cross borders. One 
example might be the increased insecurity that is a condition for young generations all 
over the world (Beck & Beck-Gemsheim 2009). This line of thinking changes the focus 
from country-based analyses to individual-based explanations related to generations or 
to use a more general concept: cohorts.
Individual Explanations: Cohorts
Individual-based explanations of secularization often focus on cohorts (Davie 2000). 
The basic idea in a cohort explanation is that the experiences in people’s formative
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years influence their values and behavior later in life. «Each new cohort makes fresh 
contact with the contemporary social heritage and carries the impress of the encounter 
through life» (Ryder 1965: 844). In values studies, this theory is most prominently 
advanced by Inglehart (1997). In relation to social change, the implication ofthe cohort 
theory is that different cohorts tend to have identical values because they are influenced 
by identical societal conditions. Even though the values of a cohort tend to be stable 
during its lifetime, change occurs because new cohorts are influenced by new social 
conditions and, hence, acquire new values.
Just like country, cohort is a «container» variable that needs to be filled with spe­
cific information. In this article, 1 distinguish between three types of cohort-based char­
acteristics: existential insecurity, education and religious socialization.
1. Existential insecurity. Inglehart (1997) and Norris and Inglehart (2004) have 
stressed the impact of living conditions, during individuals’ formative years, on reli­
gion. They argue that people who have grown up in a situation characterized by rela­
tively insecure conditions tend to focus more on religion than people who have grown 
up in relative security. Existential security is the «feeling that survival is secure enough 
that it can be taken for granted» (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 2). Existential insecurity 
may have many components. An example of a broad analysis is the study of 26 coun­
tries by Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2013) in which they analyze a large number of 
insecurities such as becoming unemployed, losing a partner or experiencing war. 
Immerzeel and van Tubergen found that all kinds of insecurities were important in 
explaining religiosity. However, lumping different insecurities such as the experience 
of war or unemployment in the same concept seems theoretically less fruitful. Instead, 
I will focus on financial uncertainties, which seem to be the focus of Norris and Ingle- 
hart’s theory (2004). This variable will be called economic deprivation in the following 
analysis.
2. Formal education is also an important factor for secularization. Stubager (2008) 
identifies three general effects of school socialization: psychodynamic factors (control 
over own life), cognitive factors (sophisticated reasoning), and socialization (internal­
ization of values). In schools, education is becoming more rationalist and tends to 
provide «information about rather than in religious beliefs» (Davie 2000); and, accord­
ing to Moor (2014), highly-educated people have less need for religion because, in gen­
eral, they have higher cognitive capacities. However, this conclusion does not apply to 
all survey research (Norris and Inglehart 2004), and there seems to be a complex rela­
tionship between education and religion at both the country and individual level.
3. Religious socialization. The impact of generational socialization is strongly 
stressed by Voas and Doebler (2014), who convincingly show that decline in church 
attendance is primarily due to the lack of the generational transfer of values. Children 
of non-churchgoers in Britain rarely engage in church attendance (Voas and Crockett 
2005). Voas and Doebler’s multilevel models of EVS data show that people who are 
regular churchgoers are more likely to see the transmission of faith as important, and 
they conclude that «ultimately religion depends on the commitment of one generation 
to pass it on to the next» (Voas and Doebler 2014: 248).
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There may be different agents of religious socialization: parents, peers, or the 
school (see Cornwall 1988). Himmelfarb (1980) has argued that socialization in these 
groups may be mutually reinforcing since parents may socialize their children in reli­
gion by channeling them into other groups or organizations that will reinforce what 
was learned at home. Channeling presupposes that socialization begins in the family, 
but it is, of course, possible that secondary socialization in school or confirmation 
classes have an equally strong or, perhaps, even stronger impact on the individual’s 
religiosity than family socialization. For instance, Davie (2002) has argued that, in 
spite of major differences in the relationship between schools and religion in different 
parts of Europe, there is a general tendency for school education to become more sec­
ular.
The three types of explanation may be considered supplementary. Hence, the fol­
lowing hypotheses may be formulated:
Secularization is stronger among individuals who (H3a) have a high education, 
(H3b) have a low degree of religious socialization and (H3c) experienced a low 
degree of economic deprivation during their formative years.
Data, Analytical Strategy and Measurement
Data
This article is based on data from the European Values Study, which was carried out in 
European countries in four waves: 1981, 1990,1999 and 2008. Identical questionnaires 
were used in the different countries in each year, and there were large overlaps between 
the questions in each wave.1
In order to analyze long-term changes, this article has selected only countries that 
participated in the EVS project in all four waves: Belgium, Denmark, France, West 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, 
and Northern Ireland. The total number of respondents is 64,792.
Unfortunately, some of the most theoretically relevant variables are not included in 
the combined dataset 1981-2008 but only in the 2008 data. Thus, the second part of the 
article, which includes analyses of regions, is only based on 2008 data. This part of the 
article only includes countries with a regional structure, i.e. more than two regional 
units.
Analytical Strategy
The analytical strategy in the article is to focus on relationships rather than only on the 
dependent variable (Aneshensel 2002). For this reason, traditional regression analysis 
is less suited to the analysis. Instead, graphical chain models (Lauritzen 1996) using 
the DIGRAM software (Kreiner 1996,2013) were applied. The software allows for the 
analysis of ordinal data with one of several variables at the same level in the causal 
structure and provides the possibility of testing the collapsibility of regions. The pro­
cedure is based on the principle of table analysis for which there is a long tradition in
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the social sciences (Aneshensel 2002; Davis 1971; Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg 1955). 
The idea is to analyze all relationships between variables when controlled for the other 
variables in the model. Partial y-coefficients are used to measure associations.
The statistical collapsibility procedure means that regions are collapsed if the dis­
tribution of Christian beliefs in one region does not significantly differ from the distri­
bution of Christian beliefs in another region, given the other variables in the model. 
After two regions have been collapsed, they are considered to be one new category, 
which is compared with the other categories, and the analysis continues until there are 
significant differences between all categories of regions.
Measurement
The analysis includes the following variables: Secularization, which is measured in 
two ways: 1) as a change in Christian beliefs and, 2) as a change in the relationship 
between Christian beliefs and morality. The intervening variables are education, reli­
gious socialization and economic deprivation and the independent variables are cohort, 
country, and region.
The dependent variables:
The variable Christian beliefs is an index that is based on four items: «Which, if any, 
of the following do you believe in? God, Hell, Heaven, Sin». Respondents were asked 
to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each question. These items form an index in which Loev- 
inger’s H = 0.845 and Chronbach’s Alpha = 0.826. The index was constructed by com­
puting the number of ‘yes’ answers. This index has previously been used by Andersen 
et al. (2013).
Morality is defined as behaviors «which were and often still are regarded as sinful 
according to traditional Christian doctrine» (Halman and van Ingen 2013). The EVS 
questionnaire asks people whether a certain kind of behavior can be justified on a 10- 
point scale from 1 = can never be justified to 10 = can always be justified. Four items 
have been selected: Justification for divorce, euthanasia, suicide, taking soft drugs. 
Based on these items, an additive index was constructed (Loevinger’s H= 0.470, Cron- 
bach’s alpha = 0.710). In the analysis, the index was recoded into four categories.
The intervening variables:
Education: «What is the highest level of education you have completed in your educa­
tion?» (recoded into three categories).
Socialization: «Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often 
did you attend religious services when you were 12 years old?» (eight response cate­
gories).
Economic deprivation: «When you think about your parents, when you were about 
14 years old, could you say whether this statement correctly describes your parents? 
My parent(s) had problems making ends meet» (four response categories).
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The independent variables:
Country: Respondent’s country of residence.
Cohort is measured by year of birth and coded in the following categories: 1 (- 
1918) 2 (1919-1927) 3 (1928-1936) 4 (1937-1945) 5 (1946-1954) 6 (1955-1963) 7 
(1964-1972) 8 (1973-1981) 9 (1981—).
Regions: The regional analysis is based on the EU’s Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics (NUTS). For the analysis, the NUTS2 level has been used. NUTS2 
represents what most countries call «regions», which is the middle administrative level 
between country and local districts. Among the relevant countries, several had to be 
omitted. 1 he respondents’ NUTS2 location was not registered in Norway. Iceland, 
Malta, and Northern Ireland have only one region. Ireland only has two regions. These 
countries were omitted from the analysis. Former East Germany is included in the data­
set. This means that a total of nine countries (or 10 if East and West Germany are seen 
as two different units) are part of the data set: Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Neth­
erlands, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, East and West Germany. The NUTS2 classifi­
cation is applied in different ways in different countries. In Germany, for instance, the 
NUTS2 classification includes 37 categories and, in Great Britain, 36 categories. In 
other countries, the NUTS2 classification has many fewer units. Due to the low number 
of interviews in some regions, an initial discretionary reduction of the 130 NUTS2 
regions was carried out. The number of regions was reduced to 13 in Germany and 12 
in Great Britain, and similar reductions were carried out in other countries. This pro­
cedure resulted in recoding the total number of NUTS2 categories into 50 regions.
Results
This section begins with a descriptive analysis of secularization in the 13 countries in 
which the EVS study was carried out four times from 1981 to 2008 and moves on to 
analyze secularization in cohorts and regions based on 2008 data.
Secularization from 1981 to 2008
As a background for the subsequent causal analysis, the first task is to show that the 
general process of secularization in Europe (Davie 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004) is 
occurring in the countries that have been selected for the analysis. As mentioned above, 
secularization is measured in two ways: as decrease in Christian beliefs and as decrease 
in the correlation between Christian beliefs and morality. The results are shown in 
Table 1.
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Table I. Christian beliefs (means) and y-correlations between Christian beliefs and morality 
(1981-2008).
Christian beliefs Correlation between morality 
and Christian beliefs
1981 2008 1981 2008
Denmark 1.12 1.05 0.46 0.31
Sweden 1.23 0.75 0.37 0.47
France 1.45 1.37 0.38 0.27
Netherlands 1.68 1.43 0.44 0.52
Belgium 1.71 1.55 0.24 0.31
West Germany 1.76 1.69 0.44 0.27
Iceland 2.06 1.78 0.32 0.28
Italy 2.19 2.22 0.48 0.43
Great Britain 2.26 1.90 0.28 0.36
Spain 2.28 1.85 0.47 0.47
Ireland 3.17 2.62 0.46 0.33
Malta 3.53 3.51 0.57 0.53
The countries in Table 1 are sorted according the mean of the Christian beliefs variable 
in 1981. The table shows considerable variation in the support for Christian beliefs with 
Denmark and Sweden at the one extreme with low support for Christian beliefs and 
Ireland and Malta at the other extreme with high support. There is a decrease in Chris­
tian beliefs in 12 of 13 countries and stagnation in Italy. Hence, this part of the table 
generally supports hypothesis 1. The results for the correlations are more complex. In 
most countries, there is the hypothesized decrease in correlations between Christian 
beliefs and morality; but, in Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Great Britain, there 
is an increase. These countries are quite different, and there does not seem to be an 
evident explanation for the different developments in the countries with respect to the 
correlation between morality and Christian beliefs.
In spite of this variation, it seems acceptable to say that there is a general tendency 
towards secularization in 13 countries in Western Europe and that hypothesis 1 is cor­
roborated. The next step is to understand this development in two ways: at the individ­
ual level and at the country and regional level.
Cohort and Secularization
Cohorts are people bom at a specific point in time, and the impact of cohorts on religion 
(or any other variable for that matter) begs the question of what exactly it is about cohorts 
that has an impact on secularization. Statistically, this means treating the different char-
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acteristics related to cohorts as intervening variables between cohort and the two mea­
sures of secularization. Hypothesis 3 listed three intervening variables that all are related 
to the individual’s formative years: economic deprivation, religious socialization and 
education. When these variables are simultaneously included as intervening variables 
between cohort and Christian beliefs, a very clear picture emerges. Christian beliefs have 
no correlation with economic deprivation, a very small correlation with education (y = 
0.05) and a very strong correlation with religious socialization (y = 0.38). In other words, 
there is strong support for hypothesis 3b (about religious socialization), whereas hypoth­
esis 3a (education) and 3c (material deprivation) are refuted. Thus, the impact of cohort 
on secularization is best understood by the impact of religious socialization.
Younger cohorts have not been as socialized into religion. Hence, the consequence 
of the strong relationship between socialization and Christian values may be inter­
preted as a very strong mechanism in the transfer of religiosity. In general, older 
cohorts have received more religious socialization than the younger cohorts. Hence, 
there is a stronger transmission of religiosity in older than in younger cohorts. Since 
values tend to be stable, value change will influence society as the cohorts become 
older. That is, when people who are not as socialized into religion have children, these 
children will be even less socialized into religion. This process results in a decline in 
Christian beliefs in society.
The decrease in religious socialization does not only create a decline in Christian 
beliefs, it also produces increased value fragmentation between Christian beliefs and 
morality. The y correlation is 0.38 for people bom before 1946 and 0.28 for people bom 
in 1946 or after. This means that value fragmentation will increase as younger cohort 
replace older cohorts. In sum, the decrease in religious socialization will result in a decline 
in Christian beliefs and a decline in the impact of Christian beliefs on socialization.
Country, Region and Religiosity
Both religion and country are institutions that confer identity and values to the individ­
ual (Martin 1978), and these institutions interact in relation to shaping religious values. 
Some of the social institutions (e.g. state regulations) vary in different countries while 
others (e.g. religious institutions) are relatively similar in different countries. If coun­
tries are divided into regions, it is possible to estimate whether there is greater similar­
ity between regions within a country or between regions in different countries. In rela­
tion to secularization, this means studying whether it is a country-based institution 
(state regulation) or a border-crossing institution (in this case, the religious denomina­
tion that has traditionally dominated a region) that explains secularization.
The means of Christian beliefs and the correlation between Christian beliefs and 
morality is depicted in Table 2. The rows in the table are sorted in such a way that the 
regions with the highest mean of Christian beliefs are in the top row of the table and 
the lowest mean in the bottom row. The statistical analysis (not detailed here) shows 
that the distribution of the variable «Christian beliefs» is identical for each group in the 
region, given the other variables in the statistical model. Based on the collapsibility 
method mentioned above, the 50 regions have been reduced to 11 categories.3
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The table may be read in two ways: horizontally and vertically. The rows represent 
the collapsed regions, and the columns display the values of the dependent variables 
for each regional category.
Table 2. Means of Christian beliefs and the correlation between Christian beliefs and morality 
in collapsed regions in Europe.
Collapsed regions Christian
beliefs:
Means
Partial y -  
correlation 
between 
beliefs and 
morality
Pet. who say 
they belong 
to a
Catholic
denominati
on*
Number of 
respondents
Italy: Sicilia, Sardegna 2.5 0.36 99 529
Germany: Bayern 
Spain: Centro, Canaries
2.1 0.33 83 443
Italy: All other regions 
Spain: Madrid, Sur
2.0 0.46 90 1512
France: Est
Germany: Baden-Wiirttemberg 
Spain: Noroeste
1.8 0.44 72 1021
Belgium: Brussels 
France: Calais 
Netherlands: Nord
1.7 0.38 53 439
Belgium: Vlaams, Wallone 
France: Méditerranée 
Germany: Hessen, Nordrhein-West­
falen, Rheinland-Pfalz 
Netherlands: Oost, Zuid
1.5 0.32 75 2675
France: Ile-de-France, Bassin parisi- 
en, Ouest, Sud Ouest, Centre-Est 
Germany: Niedersachsen, Schles­
wig-Holstein 
Netherlands: West
1.3 0.40 60 2013
Denmark: all regions except Copen­
hagen
1.1 0.30 0 1122
Denmark: Copenhagen 
Germany: Thuringen 
Sweden: all regions except Stock­
holm
0.8 0.42 2 1295
Germany: Mecklenburg-Vorpom­
mern, Sachsen 
Sweden: Stockholm
0.6 0.35 9 648
Germany: Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Sachsen-Anhalt
0.4 0.28 19 475
* computed among people who say that they belong to a denomination.
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The table shows that two Italian regions, Calabria and Sicily, have the highest score on 
Christian beliefs. These two regions do not differ in relation to denomination, and both 
are a part of the same country. As shown in row three, the other Italian regions show less 
support for Christian beliefs. If a «state matters» explanation is correct, all Italian 
regions should have been collapsed into the same category. This is not the case. This 
means that some explanation other than country-based variables (such as GDP, state 
regulation or, for that matter, some measure of a special Italian culture) must be at stake. 
In other words, a comparison of the first and the third rows indicates that an analysis 
limited to a comparison of countries overlooks important differences within countries. 
Moving through the table, it can be seen that there are no instances in which all regions 
in a country are located in the same category. Hence, the result for Italy may be genera­
lized to all the countries: An analysis of Christian beliefs is limited or even misleading 
when researchers only compare countries.
This said, there is a tendency for regions in different countries to be more similar 
than different—except for Germany, which will be discussed shortly. The regions for 
each country are not scattered randomly in the table but tend to cluster, i.e. to be located 
in rows that follow each other. This indicates that there are important differences in 
countries but also that the regions in each country tend to «familiarize».
One might think that neighboring regions would be identical with respect to secu­
larization, but this is far from always the case. For instance, the eastern and not the 
southern regions of France have been collapsed into the same category as have regions 
in the northern parts of Spain. There are, however, cases in which neighboring cross­
national regions are classified in the same category. Copenhagen, for instance, is cate­
gorized in the same category as Skåne, its neighboring region in Sweden, but the anal­
ysis shows that all Swedish regions except for Stockholm belong to the same category, 
i.e. that the distribution of Christian beliefs in Copenhagen is not only identical to 
regions in southern Sweden but also to regions in the northern parts of Sweden. These 
examples show that there are important in-country differences in Christian beliefs, and 
there is no clear tendency for regions on both sides of a national border to be identical. 
In other words, country characteristics play a role for secularization, but variations in 
secularization cannot be reduced to country differences.
Germany, as mentioned, represents the most complicated picture. The German 
regions are scattered all over the table with Bavaria in row two as a region with strong 
support for Christian values, whereas Berlin, Brandenburg and Sachsen-Anhalt are 
located at the bottom of the table and characterized by the least support for Christian 
values as well as the lowest correlation between morality and Christian beliefs. The 
explanation for this difference among the German regions is regional differences in 
denomination and the differing histories of East and West Germany. If the table is read 
vertically, the former West German regions are at the top of the table, and the Catholic 
regions are located higher than the Protestant regions. The former East German regions 
are located at the bottom, which is no doubt a consequence of the attempts to diminish 
the role of religion in the DDR. From a cohort perspective, these regions include people 
whose religious socialization have been very restricted, which, in turn, leads to less 
support for Christian values and a smaller impact of Christian values on morality.
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So far, the analysis has shown that a country-based explanation is inadequate: there 
are important differences between regions in each country. The next step is to discuss 
whether there are institutional border-crossing explanations for the level of Christian 
beliefs. This may be illustrated with the data in column four in Table 2. The column 
distinguishes between two types of religious institutions: countries dominated by Prot­
estant and by Catholic denominations. This is not just a distinction between two faiths 
but includes a broader range of cultural and political characteristics (Davie 2000). For 
each category of collapsed regions is presented the percentage of respondents who say 
that they belong to the Catholic Church. Comparing the upper and the lower part of the 
table according to denomination in each region, it becomes clear that the regions in the 
lower part of the table belong to Protestant denominations, whereas the upper part of 
the table consists of regions that belong to the Catholic faith. This shows the impor­
tance of religious institutions (where the region is dominated by Protestant or Catholic 
denominations) for secularization. However, this analysis should only be considered as 
a rough estimate of the denomination as a societal institution.
In the EVS study, people were asked about their denomination in two steps: first, 
they were asked whether they belonged to a denomination and, second, they were 
asked which denomination they belonged to. Of the 16,542 respondents, 12,066 (72 
pet.) said that they belonged to a denomination. This makes the analysis complicated 
because of national differences in the frequency of people who belong to a denomina­
tion. In some countries such as Protestant Denmark or Catholic Italy, almost everybody 
belongs to a denomination, whereas only about half of the respondents in regions in 
France, The Netherlands or Belgium, for instance, belong to a denomination. If a better 
measure were available of religious institutions at the regional level than aggregated 
survey data, it would be possible to do a more refined analysis, but the data in Table 2 
still suggests that it is plausible that the character of the religious institution plays a 
vital role in explaining the level of Christian beliefs.
Returning to the hypothesis 2 about the relationship between a country-based and a 
region-based analysis, the analysis has shown that both explanations may be relevant. 
There are important differences in each country with respect to religious values, which 
means that a country-based analysis may be problematic, but regions within countries 
also tend to cluster, which provides some support to a country-based approach. The 
interpretation of the country variable needs to be elaborated more than is possible in 
this article. Country differences may be due to factors that are traditionally used in 
modernization theory (e.g. wealth), but an institutionalist approach to understanding 
country differences would include the role of the state church (Davie 2002) or state reg­
ulations of religion. The predominant denomination is a separate institution that may 
cross state boundaries. This institution has an impact on how people think about reli­
gion and about their religious behavior.
Cohort, Region and Religious Socialization
The preceding sections have analyzed the importance of regions and religious social­
ization for secularization, and this section combines the results of these analyses. As
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mentioned, the analysis of regions and socialization could only be carried out on the 
2008 data. Secularization is a process and should be studied from a time perspective as 
was done in the first part of this article. In order to study change, cohorts have been 
included in the analysis. By comparing the analysis of the impact of socialization and 
regions on Christian beliefs—and on the relationship between Christian beliefs and 
morality—we should be able to analyze social change by comparing older and younger 
cohorts. The expectation is that secularization is stronger in younger than in older gen­
erations and that this is the case even when regions and socialization are included in 
the analysis.
Table 3 shows the two measures of secularization: Christian beliefs and the rela­
tionship between Christian beliefs and morality for a combination of cohorts, region, 
and religious socialization. In order to simplify the analysis, the three variables have 
been recoded as follows: Cohort: 1) bom 1945 or before, 2) born 1946 or later, regions 
recoded in 1) traditionally Catholic and 2) traditionally Protestant regions, Religious 
socialization, church attendance at age 12 1) once a year or more often, 2) less often or 
never.
The table consists of two parts—one for each measure of secularization, the mean 
value of Christian beliefs and the y value of the correlation between Christian beliefs 
and morality.
Table 3. The relationship between cohort, regions, socialization and secularization— measured 
by means with respect to Christian beliefs and y-values for the relationship between Christian 
beliefs and morality.
Means, Christian beliefs
Cohorts Socialization Protestant-dominated
regions
Catholic-dominated
regions
B orn-1945 Strong socialization 1.4 1.6
Born -1945 Weak socialization 0.8 0.7
Bom 1946- Strong socialization 1.2 1.4
Bom 1946- Weak socialization 0.6 0.4
y-correlations between Christian beliefs and morality
Cohorts Socialization Protestant-dominated
regions
Catholic-dominated
regions
B o m -1945 Strong socialization 0.30 0.41
Bom -1945 Weak socialization (0.18) 0.30
Born 1946- Strong socialization 0.38 0.44
Bom 1946- Weak socialization (-0.03)* (0.28)*
* y-values in parentheses mean that the correlation is insignificant (p>0.01).
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Comparing, first, the difference between strong and weak socialization, we find that 
people who are strongly socialized into religion tend to be less secular. This result holds 
even when in a comparison of cohorts and denominations and supports the argument 
about the importance of socialization for secularization.
We should also expect that people in Catholic regions have stronger Christian 
beliefs than people in Protestant regions. This expectation is confirmed among those 
who have been strongly socialized in religion. However, when we compare people who 
are weakly socialized, we find the opposite result: people who live in Protestant 
regions tend to have higher levels of Christian beliefs compared to people who live in 
Catholic regions. This surprising result may be due to differences in religious cultures 
in Protestant and Catholic regions. In Protestant regions, it is more common for people 
not to go to church. Perhaps, people who do not go to church in a Catholic region may 
be considered as unusual. Hence, not going to church as a child is related to a stronger 
anti-religious conviction in Catholic rather than in Protestant regions. In other words, 
there may be a selection process rather than a socialization process taking place.
Conclusion and Discussion
Based on a most-similar-approach designed analysis of Western European countries, 
this article has gone into detail with two contested factors in determining secularization 
at the individual level: cohort and country. The most important aspect of using cohorts 
is the degree to which people are socialized into religion. As people are less socialized, 
they tend to be less religious. Hence, religious socialization functions almost like a 
machine: a decline in religious socialization results in less religiosity, which, in turn, 
leads to less socialization. If socialization, the cause of decline in religiosity, does not 
change, the process of secularization seems to be irreversible (see Lieberson 1985). 
Are there factors that may change this development? An answer to this question may 
depend on which socialization agents and processes are considered. Due to limitations 
in data, it has only been possible to use church attendance at the age of 12 as an oper­
ationalization of religious socialization. This operationalization does not answer the 
question of the impact of socialization agents; it only shows that people who attended 
the church to a lesser degree as children tend to have fewer Christian beliefs and more 
value fragmentation between religious and secular values. Parents, peers, the church, 
the school and the media are important socialization agents. An increased emphasis on 
religion among these agents may increase socialization and may reverse the tendency 
toward increased secularization in the long run.
An example of such change might be an increased emphasis on teaching Christian 
values in schools. However, such a development does not seem very likely (Davie 
2000). Another type of impact is through confirmation classes. Niemela (2006) has 
shown that, in Finland, young people’s attitudes toward Christianity and belief in God 
frequently became more positive during confirmation classes. It is difficult to tell 
whether such result may be generalized and whether the short-term effect of confirma­
tion classes also results in long-term effects. At any rate, the consequences of this
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change depend on the frequency young people attend confirmation classes. For 
instance, in Denmark, there was an increase in confirmation frequency for 14-year-old 
persons of Danish origin from 0.78 to 0.79 from 2008 to 2013 (Statistikbanken 2014). 
This small change will hardly alter the process of secularization, and the general 
decrease in many other Western European countries of people leaving majority 
churches does not make it likely that new modes of socialization will result in less sec­
ularization.
Socialization as a mechanism for social change, of course, raises the question of 
how or why the decrease in religiosity occurred in the first place. The socialization 
machine must start sometime. It seems likely that the causal processes behind secular­
ization may vary in different periods of time and that we should be careful not to gen­
eralize the explanations for the period after 1970 to earlier periods. The steep increase 
in secularization indicates that secularization before WW1I may be related to period 
effects such as, for instance, urbanization or educational changes.
The other part of the article suggested that country comparisons may conceal the 
fact that there are important differences in secularization within countries. The choice 
of country as a unit for analysis is often convenient because macro-data are available 
at the country level, but it may be just as important to investigate the differences in sec­
ularization within countries or in border-crossing regions between countries.
Including sub-country regions in the analysis expands the analysis of seculariza­
tion, and this article has suggested that secularization may be explained not only by 
country-related factors but also by institutions that characterize regions in different 
countries. The importance of the religious institution is, perhaps, most clearly seen in 
the analysis of a single country—Germany—where both the regional differences in tra­
ditional denominations and the different histories of East and West Germany play an 
important role in understanding the process of secularization.
In short, this article has contributed two results. First, there is a strong and stable 
result that social change due to cohort replacement may be primarily understood by the 
respondents’ religious socialization during their formative years. Second, there is the 
result that not only country but institutional explanations are important for understand­
ing secularization and that this may be studied by comparing border-crossing regional 
variations. This article has focused on the impact of religious institutions; but, when it 
comes to the impact of other border-crossing institutions, more work is needed to iden­
tify and classify the most relevant institutions. The fact that several interacting institu­
tions may have an impact on secularization does not make this task any easier.
Notes
1 For general information about the EVS project, see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ and 
http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/.
2 y is a rank correlation coefficient, which is suited for ordinal data. Partial y coefficients are 
measures of correlations when controlling for the other variables in the model—akin to fis 
in OLS multiple regressions.
For technical reasons Great Britain was omitted for this part of the analysis.
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